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The progressivity of personal income tax in South 
Africa since 1994 and directions for tax reform
T.J. Steenekamp
3A B S T R A C T
5The imperative to reduce poverty levels in South Africa requires not 
less but more public expenditure and probably higher tax levels. The 
purpose of this study is, firstly, to examine the impact of personal 
income tax reforms since 1994 on the tax structure and its scope to 
meet the challenges of rising needs and equity. Secondly, the study 
aims to provide a broad outline of personal income tax approaches 
that are globally considered as alternative reform options. The study 
finds that in South Africa, direct taxes as a percentage of total tax 
revenue increased in importance between 1993/94 and 2010/11. 
The personal income tax burden for wage earners in South Africa 
has remained fairly constant since 1995. The personal income 
tax structure is progressive, but there was a declining trend in 
progressivity between 1994 and 2009. Increasing personal income 
tax rates is constrained by low company tax rates, possible increased 
efficiency costs and ‘herd behaviour’. The income tax system in 
South Africa conforms to a semi-comprehensive income tax system. 
The tax reform option that holds the most promise for developing 
countries (and South Africa) is the dual income tax system.
6Key words: personal income tax, tax reform, progressivity, tax burden, marginal tax 
rates, tax threshold, comprehensive personal income tax, dual income tax
Introduction
1Tax systems evolve over time in a quest to improve economic performance and to 
finance social goals. Various factors – some of which are internal to countries and 
others of which are global – impact on tax reforms in individual countries. The South 
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African economy is characterised by high unemployment, large social and income 
inequalities and low levels of foreign direct investment. Economic growth rates are 
at levels that are unlikely to reduce poverty significantly over the short term and even 
longer term. To achieve all the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), major 
investments are required that need to be financed (UN Millennium Project 2005). 
The impact of the global financial crisis of 2007/08 led to huge bailouts and rescue 
plans for governments, which resulted in budget deficits and bloated public debt to 
GDP ratios. South Africa was less affected, but not spared, and faces fiscal austerity 
measures that will hamstring expenditure and/or lead to tax increases. 
The UN assumes major increases in government expenditures on the MDGs of up 
to four percentage points of GDP until 2015 and suggests using a broad-based revenue 
source such as a value-added tax. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (2010a: 20–21) concluded that the best tax policy options for 
promoting economic growth (from a least-distortionary perspective) are recurrent 
taxes on immovable property, then taxes on consumption followed by other property, 
personal income tax and lastly corporate income taxes. Globalisation tends to put 
pressure on developing countries to lower their levels of taxation (Tanzi 1996, 
2004). We note, however, that the imperative to reduce poverty levels in developing 
countries, including South Africa, requires not less but more public expenditure and 
probably higher tax levels. These opposing pressures force policy-makers to reduce 
inefficiencies in public expenditure and at the same time to change the tax system to 
generate sufficient revenue in an equitable manner. Tanzi (2004: 534) remarks that 
the two ‘work horses’ that must carry this burden are the value-added tax (VAT) and 
personal income tax. VAT was introduced in South Africa in 1991 and has become 
what is generally considered to be an efficient revenue ‘milch cow’ but regressive 
tax. Personal income tax serves the purpose of raising revenue and ensuring that 
equity objectives are reached. Since high-income earners generally benefit most from 
globalisation, the personal income tax system is ideally suited to capture revenue 
from these income groups for redistributive purposes (Tanzi 2004: 540).
In this study, the focus will, firstly, be on the impact of personal income tax reforms 
in South Africa since 1994 on the tax structure and the scope of personal income tax 
to meet the challenges of rising expenditure needs and equity. Secondly, the study 
aims to provide a broad outline of personal income tax approaches that are globally 
considered as alternative reform options. Trends in the composition of taxes before 
1994 and changes in the direct tax (income tax) mix in South Africa since 1994 are 
reviewed. The personal income tax (PIT) burden, the progressivity of the PIT rate 
structure and the distributional impact of PIT reforms are analysed. The potential of 
PIT rate changes and reform alternatives in the design of the tax system to address 
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the revenue and distributional challenges are briefly reviewed. Of particular interest 
are the findings of two comprehensive reports on tax reform in the United Kingdom 
(IFS 2010, 2011; OECD 2006, 2010a). A developing country perspective is obtained 
by reviewing the research of eminent fiscal economists on tax policy and reform in 
developing countries.
Tax composition and trends in direct (income) taxes 
since 1994
1Direct (income) tax trends in the post-1994 period cannot be viewed without 
considering trends in the composition of taxes in the preceding years. Figure 1 
provides some perspective and shows how the composition of the main sources of 
tax revenue (as a percentage of total tax revenue) changed between 1981 and 1994 
(financial year ending March). It is observed that corporate income tax (CIT) and 
personal income tax (PIT) exhibit a scissor-like pattern, with PIT increasing from 
a low 16.6% in 1980/81 to 39.6% in 1993/94. In contrast, CIT decreased from 39.7% 
to 13% over the same period. At the same time, VAT as a percentage of total revenue 
increased from 12% in 1980/81 to 26.3% in 1993/94. PIT and VAT are ultimately 
borne by persons, and if one were to add the incidence of the fuel levy and other tax 
types such as user charges, it becomes clear that the relative tax share of individuals 
in total tax revenue increased significantly from the early 1980s to the early 1990s.
Against the backdrop of a rising personal income tax burden, the Katz Commission 
was tasked with a comprehensive review of the tax system in South Africa and released 
its first interim report in 1994 (Katz Commission 1994). This report was followed 
by another nine reports between 1994 and 1999. In giving direction to tax reform, 
the Katz Commission at the outset recognised that the high fiscal burden had to be 
addressed by paying attention to reducing most marginal individual rates, reducing 
the direct personal income tax burden and nominal rates of corporate tax, increasing 
the tax base, and improving tax collection (Katz Commission 1994: 11). The Katz 
Commission (1994: 12) was also astutely aware that political and equity considerations 
precluded a shift to higher VAT rates and instead bargained on improving economic 
growth rates and other policy interventions to increase tax revenue. 
Figure 2 shows revenue trends in personal income tax (PIT), company income tax 
(CIT) and direct taxes (PIT and CIT) since 1993/94. Direct taxes as a percentage of 
total tax revenue increased by 10.5% between 1993/94 and 2010/11. Using three-year 
moving averages, the increase was 9.8%. A comparison reveals that OECD countries 
(18 of the 30 countries) have also increased their share of direct taxes since 1996 







Figure 1:   Main sources of tax revenue as a percentage of total tax revenue (1980/81 
to 1993/94)
Source: National Treasury 2011 (Annexure B: Table 2); SARB 2011a (S148)
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1indirect taxes from 34.9% in 1990 (25.5% in 1970) to 40.1% in 2000 (see Bahl & Bird 
2008: 282). It seems that the tax mix in South Africa is more aligned to patterns in 
developed countries.
A further inspection of the trends in the relative importance of PIT revenue and 
CIT revenue to total tax revenue is revealing. Between 1993/94 and 1998/99, the 
contribution of PIT far exceeded the CIT share, and these ratios remained fairly 
stable until 1998/99. This period coincided with the economic downswing that lasted 
from December 1996 until August 1999. From 1999/2000, a converging pattern 
emerged. PIT revenue as a percentage of total tax revenue declined as real GDP 
growth increased until at least 2006/07. However, CIT revenue as a percentage of 
total tax revenue increased over the same period and seems to be in tandem with the 
upturn in the economic cycle that lasted from September 1999 to November 2007. As 
the economy grew, CIT revenue increased dramatically (although from a low base) 
by over 450% in nominal terms compared to the approximate 64% increase in PIT 
revenue. When the economy started slowing down in 2008, income tax revenues 
continued to increase, but from 2009/10 the share of CIT decreased sharply as CIT 
tax revenue started to drop in nominal terms. Overall the share of PIT in total tax 
revenue decreased somewhat from 39.6% in 1993/94 to 34.1% in 2010/11. In contrast, 
the share of CIT almost doubled from 13% to 22.7% over the same period. Income tax 
shares in the OECD area exhibit a similar pattern between 1995 and 2007 (OECD 
2010a: 28). 
Changes in the income tax shares are largely endogenous, but some may be 
attributed to policy interventions such as the successes of the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) in broadening the tax base and sharpened administrative vigilance, 
which impacted on compliance and tax rate reductions. In the case of company tax 
revenue increases, there may be a Laffer-type response to lower company tax rates. 
Since 1994, the personal income tax system was changed in many respects (see 
National Treasury and Department of Finance [various issues]; Manuel 2002) and 
in response to the recommendations of the Katz Commission. The number of tax 
brackets was reduced from ten to six; the child rebate was scrapped; the individual 
is now the unit of taxation; and the primary rebate was increased annually to 
compensate for inflation and to retain progressivity. South Africa also moved from 
a source of income principle to the worldwide base of taxation. The tax base was 
broadened by making almost all fringe benefits taxable and by taxing capital gains 
since 2001. Capital gains tax from individuals netted government R4.4 billion in 
revenue in 2009/10 (approximately 2.1% of taxes on persons and individuals).
T.J. Steenekamp
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South Africa
1What was the impact of the post-1994 reforms (including rate reductions) on the 
personal income tax burden, the progressivity of the PIT schedule and the distribution 
of personal income? 
The personal income tax burden
1A measure of the average (effective) personal income tax rate (or burden) is obtained 
using national accounting data (see SARB 2011a). In 1995, current taxes on income 
and wealth of households in South Africa were R51 623 million. If the gross balance 
of primary income of households as defined in the national accounts is used as the 
tax base (R398 605 million), the personal income tax burden was 13.0%. In 2010, the 
burden came to 13.5%. Over the 15-year period, it reached a maximum of 14.2% in 
1999 and recorded a low of 11.3% in 2004. This narrow definition indicates that the 
personal income tax burden has remained fairly constant since 1995. 
The burden of personal income tax can also be expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Calculated from IMF (2008), the unweighted average central government PIT/GDP 
ratio for South Africa was 8.4 in 2007. This compares to a PIT/GDP ratio of 8.2 for a 
selection of 13 developed countries and 2.0 for a selection of ten developing countries. 
However, once social security contributions are added (10.1) to the personal income 
tax revenue in developed countries, the PIT (including social security contribution)/
GDP ratio increases to 18.3.
Drawing conclusions on the basis of these tentative comparisons on the potential 
for additional PIT revenue must be done with caution. South Africa is a developing 
country and has a limited tax base of approximately six million registered taxpayers 
(National Treasury and SARS 2011: 6). These taxpayers must support close to 
14 million recipients of social assistance grants. If government proceeds with its 
intended course of making social security contributions by employees mandatory, 
it is quite clear that the personal income tax burden of South African taxpayers will 
rise significantly and will be even more out of line with developing country levels 
and patterns. In an attempt to estimate and compare tax performance, Steenekamp 
(2007) used the representative tax system approach to compile a tax effort index. The 
results for the financial years 2000/01 to 2004/05 indicate that the South African 
revenue authorities outperform comparable countries. When the different tax classes 
were considered, it was concluded that South Africa uses personal income tax and 
corporate income tax very intensively and that the total tax burden is high. These 
results suggested lower personal income taxation and corporate taxation (Steenekamp 
45 
Personal income tax reform in South Africa since 1994
2007: 14). As noted, the relatively small income tax base and the sharp increases in 
user charges on traditional public services such as education, toll fees and security on 
the overall tax burden of individuals must be acknowledged. It then becomes quite 
apparent that the scope for additional revenue from this source is indeed limited.
The progressivity of PIT
1Declining top rates of personal income tax in the past two decades and more is 
one of the most common global occurrences in taxation. As the OECD (2010a: 33) 
points out, however, this has not been matched by a reduction in the average income 
tax that is levied on the income of the average production worker. How has this 
impacted on progressivity in the personal income tax structure? Various methods 
can be used to measure progressivity. Nyamongo and Schoeman (2007) considered 
a number of such methods and reported empirical results for South Africa based 
on the procedures developed by Musgrave and Thin (1948) and Kakwani (1977). 
Regarding the reform period after 1994, Nyamongo and Schoeman’s study produced 
mixed results. According to the Musgrave and Thin procedure, progressivity declined 
between 1994 and 2003/04, whereas the Kakwani disproportionality measure shows 
that progressivity increased ‘impressively’ between 1994 and 1999/2000, but then 
declined in response to tax reforms between 1999/2000 and 2003/04 (Nyamongo & 
Schoeman 2007: 487–489).
Progressivity is affected by marginal rates but also by what has happened to 
thresholds. In this study, three measures are employed to determine how adjustments 
to the PIT rate and thresholds affected progressivity. All three measures compare the 
marginal and average tax rates for an individual worker at the average wage level in 
the economy (excluding agriculture and the public sector). This is shown in Table 1 
for South Africa and a selection of OECD countries, along with the OECD average 
(unweighted). For the industry categories noted in Table 1, the average annual 
nominal wage for South Africa was calculated at R49 014 in 1997, R66 499 in 2000 
and R123 676 in 2009.
The first progressivity measure considers the threshold at which the top marginal 
rate applies. In 1997, taxpayers on average had to earn just twice the average wage 
before the top rate became applicable (column 1). This multiple increased to 3.6 times 
in 2000 and to almost five times in 2009 – an indication of less progressivity. This is 
in contrast to the OECD pattern. The income threshold (as a multiple of the average 
wage), where the top statutory PIT rate for the OECD is levied, declined between 
2000 and 2009. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (4) ÷ (5)
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009
Australia 1.2 2.8 44.5 31.5 26.1 22.0 20.7 15.6 34.5 28.3 60.0 55.1
Hungary 0.9 0.8 56.0 45.0 23.2 21.2 17.5 11.9 30.3 27.7 57.8 43.0
Korea 5.5 3.2 6.6 14.5 2.1 4.2 0.7 1.3 6.4 8.7 10.9 14.9
Mexico 49.3 4.7 12.8 10.8 0.8 4.0 -5.9 -1.7 7.9 11.3 -74.7 -15.0
New Zealand 1.7 1.5 21.0 34.0 19.4 18.4 18.6 15.6 24.2 24.9 76.9 62.7
Poland 3.3 2.8 9.3 8.8 6.6 6.4 5.3 5.2 7.7 7.4 68.8 70.3





2.6 28.9 27.2 16.4 15.4 12.3 10.7 23.1 22.0 53.2 48.6
South Africa 3.6 4.8 37.0 18.0 18.0 10.1 11.2 6.2 27.0 15.8 41.4 39.4
(1997) (2.0) (41.0) (18.0) (9.2) (27.8) (33.2)
Notes:
a  An adult full-time worker in the covered industry sectors whose wage earnings are equal to the average wage 
earnings of such workers.
b Top PIT threshold as multiple of the average wage.
c  Gross average earnings are calculated using a broad set of industry sectors including categories C to K inclu-
sive as defined in the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Revision 
3.1, United Nations).
d Excluding Mexico.
Sources:  StatsSA (1998, 2003, 2011); National Treasury, Budget Review (various issues); OECD (2010b)
Table 1 shows that both the marginal tax rate (column 2) and average tax rate 
(column 3) for the average earner in South Africa declined between 1997 and 2009. 
This trend is also observed in some of the OECD countries, but was not that drastic 
considering the 1.0% decline in the average tax rate in all OECD countries. A second 
measure of progressivity that can also be used here is to calculate the difference 
between the marginal tax rate (column 2) and average personal income tax rates 
(column 3), divided by 1 minus the average personal income tax rate, for an average 
worker (see OECD 2010a: 34 & 44). A higher number indicates higher progressivity at 
the earnings level of an average worker. In 1997, the percentage was 0.28, compared 
to 0.08 in 2009 implying that progressivity declined over this period. In 2009, the 
OECD average was 0.14, with Turkey at 0.07 and Hungary at 0.30. However, this 
progressivity measure does not consider the impact of tax changes on lower and 
higher incomes.
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The third progressivity measure compares the burden faced by persons earning 
two-thirds of the average wage with the burden faced by their counterparts earning 
five-thirds of the average wage (see OECD 2010b:131). Column 4 is compared to 
column 5. In 1997, a South African worker earning two-thirds of the average wage 
(i.e. the ‘poor’ taxpayer) paid 33.2% of the tax burden faced by the worker earning 
five-thirds of the average wage level (the ‘rich’ taxpayer). In 2000, the tax burden of 
the lower-paid worker was 41.5% of the ‘rich’ taxpayer’s burden, and in 2009 this 
ratio was 39.4%. Overall personal income tax was less progressive in 2009 compared 
to 1997, but when the within-time period is considered, personal income taxes first 
became less progressive (between 1997 and 2000) and then increased marginally in 
progressivity (between 2000 and 2009). The increased progressivity in the last decade 
is also observed in OECD countries where the worker earning two-thirds of the 
average wage level paid 53% in 2000 and 48% in 2009 of the tax burden of the worker 
earning five-thirds of the average wage level (OECD 2010b: 131). In eight OECD 
countries, personal income tax became less progressive (including Korea, Mexico 
and Poland), and in 20 countries personal income taxes became more progressive.
The distribution of personal income and PIT reforms
1According to the Income and Expenditure of Households 2005/06 Survey (IES) 
of Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), income inequality is confirmed by high Gini 
coefficients. Based on disposable income (from work and social grants) for the whole 
country, the Gini coefficient was 0.72. If social grants and taxes are excluded, the 
Gini coefficient for the whole country would be 0.80 – that is, the reduction of 
inequality through redistributive policies reduces the Gini coefficient by 8 percentage 
points (StatsSA 2008: 4). The top 10% of the population and the bottom 90% of the 
population each account for approximately 50% of household income reported in 
IES, with the poorest 20% accounting for less than 1.5% of income (StatsSA 2008: 
33).
Measures to redistribute conventionally include social transfers and a progressive 
income tax system. When reported income tax in the IES is considered, the income 
skewness in South Africa is matched by a similar skewness in personal income tax 
paid. Statistics South Africa (2008: 10–11), however, cautions that the income tax 
reported in the IES 2005/06 Survey ‘appears low’ and is poorly captured. The most 
affluent 10% of households reported 68% of income tax, while the 50% of households 
receiving the lowest incomes accounted for just 1.4% of income tax. The average 
effective tax rate – defined as the share of income tax within gross income minus 
imputed rent – rises from approximately 1% in decile 1 to 9.3% in decile 10, reflecting 
T.J. Steenekamp
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the progressive nature of the South African personal income tax system. StatsSA 
(2008: 33) nevertheless concludes that taking taxation into account “reveals no 
statistically significant impact on inequality”. 
In a fiscal incidence study conducted by Van der Berg (2009), a Gini coefficient for 
pre-transfer income of 0.69 is reported. This coefficient dropped to 0.52 for income 
plus benefits and to 0.47 after taxes had also been subtracted. Van der Berg (2009: 
17) concluded that this illustrated that the South African fiscal process was highly 
distributive and that social spending in particular reduced the Gini coefficient much 
more than the progressive income tax system did.
Nyamongo and Schoeman (2007) also considered the redistributive effect 
of the tax burden in South Africa. Using the Musgave and Thin approach, their 
results indicate a small decline in redistribution between 1994 and 1999/2000, 
but a significant deterioration between 1999/2000 and 2003/2004. In contrast, the 
Kakwani redistributive measure shows a marginal decline in progressivity since 1994 
(Nyamongo & Schoeman 2007: 489).
The empirical evidence on the impact of taxation on redistribution in South 
Africa since 1994 is not very encouraging. This conclusion is confirmed by other 
fiscal incidence studies that show that the redistributive effects of taxes are minor in 
developing countries and that expenditure programmes are much more progressive 
(see Bird & Zolt 2005: 931). For example, Barreix and Roca (2007: 137–138) show that 
in Latin America, the PIT improves the Gini coefficient by more than 1 percentage 
point in the case of Mexico only. Unsurprisingly, Bird and Zolt (2008: 81) state 
that “the most effective way to reduce inequality is not through taxation but rather 
through spending programs targeted at the poor”.
PIT rate changes and thoughts on reforming personal 
income tax
1Improving the income distribution and more (not less) tax revenue to meet ever-
increasing demands for public services remain challenges that South Africa faces. 
Conventional wisdom, or good tax policy, requires a reduction in PIT rates and of 
course that tax collection be further improved and the tax base broadened. PIT rate 
changes will be considered here. Another perspective that may shed light on the 
revenue and distributional challenges is the possibility of system failure. In other 
words, should the tax system not be redesigned to meet these and other challenges? 
A comprehensive evaluation of the present system cannot be attempted here, but brief 
attention will be given to current thinking on possible alternatives. 
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PIT rate changes
1Because of the recent global economic crisis, the OECD (2010a: 98) notes that further 
reductions in the top PIT rate will be resisted and remarks that many countries are 
actually considering raising their top PIT rates. In the UK, the Liberal Democrats 
called for a new and draconian tax on bank bonuses (Guardian 2010), and even 
billionaire investor Warren Buffet favours the United States taxing the wealthy more 
(Timeslive 2010). The OECD (2010a: 98) suggests that a second-best solution to 
promote entrepreneurship might be the implementation of an increase in the top 
marginal PIT rate accompanied by more generous loss-offset provisions to increase 
risk-taking by risk-averse entrepreneurs (OECD 2010a: 98). When developing 
countries face revenue challenges, the politically most acceptable approach is also to 
raise tax rates. Bird (2008a: 10–11) cautions against this option when the tax base is 
small and also politically weak. Horizontal and vertical inequity may be exacerbated, 
and the efficiency cost created by tax distortions increases (more or less with the 
square of the tax rate).
Another angle on increasing (or decreasing) PIT rates comes from the association 
between company income tax (CIT) rates and personal income tax rates. Without 
going into the whole debate concerning tax arbitrage opportunities where a gap 
between the top PIT and CIT rate occurs, it would suffice to say that low company 
tax rates increase the cost of maintaining high personal rates (Ganghof 2006). If 
company tax rates are assumed to be exogenous, the results from a simple cross-
sectional regression analysis of 38 OECD and EU member countries suggest that 
lower company tax rates pull down PIT rates on high wages and above-normal 
capital income (Ganghof 2006).
In concert with global tax practice, PIT rates in South Africa have reduced from 
time to time since 1994. The top marginal personal income tax rate was lowered 
in steps from 45% to 42% in 2000/01, and to 40% in 2002/03. Figure 3 compares 
the statutory top marginal personal income tax rates in South Africa with those of 
countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for 2009. The 
average top marginal PIT rate in SADC (30%) is much lower than in the OECD 
(41%) and in South Africa (40%). In SADC, the only country where the top marginal 
personal income tax rate exceeds that of South Africa is the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC). The PIT rate in South Africa is therefore at the same level as the 
average OECD PIT rates. The scope for higher personal income tax rates seems to be 
constrained by already-high marginal tax rates, a small tax base and a CIT rate that 





•  Unweighted averages for OECD are the top statutory tax rates (combined central and sub-cen-
tral) that apply at the threshold level.
•  Tax rates for SADC are for central government.
Sources: SADC (2011); OECD (2011); OECD (2010b)
Figure 3: Statutory top marginal PIT rates (2009)
Alternative PIT designs
1Given the current thinking and empirical evidence on personal income tax policy 
and reform, the direction of fundamental personal income tax reform globally can 
be categorised into four alternative personal income tax approaches: reforming the 
comprehensive personal income tax (CPIT) system, the flat tax system, presumptive 
taxation and the dual income tax (DIT) system (see IFS 2010, 2011; OECD 2006, 
2010; Bahl & Bird 2008, Bird 2008a, 2008b; Keen, Kim & Varsano 2008; Bird & 
Zolt 2005, 2008, 2010). In brief, the CPIT combines a progressive rate schedule for 
all sources of income with a system of tax reliefs; the flat tax system provides for a 
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assessment system using indicators such as assets or turnover; and the DIT combines 
a single (low) tax rate on capital income with a progressive rate structure for labour 
income.
The income tax system in South Africa conforms to a semi-comprehensive income 
tax system. The semi-CPIT system is prone to tax arbitrage as individuals restructure 
their tax affairs to exploit exemptions, allowances and (savings and investment) after-
tax rate differentials. Globalisation forces least developed countries (LDCs) to lower 
tax rates on mobile resources (for example, professionals). Tax revenue comes under 
pressure, and both horizontal and vertical equity principles are violated. It is also 
a complex system. In the past two decades, a number of alternative approaches to 
reforming personal income tax were proposed. One option is to make the CPIT 
system better by a further reduction in rates, broadening the labour and capital tax 
base, more withholding, even fewer rates (two to three) and allowing expensing of 
costs incurred in generating income (including expensing of costs on cash saved and 
invested) (see OECD 2010a: chapter 5; IFS 2011). Bird and Zolt (2005: 938) note that 
it is far from certain that the expected additional revenue and other benefits expected 
from these reforms “will justify the additional administrative and political costs”.
The flat rate income tax option is a response mainly to the administrative 
complexity of the comprehensive income tax and the inefficiencies created by taxing 
labour income and capital income at different rates (see Barreix & Roca 2007: 127; 
Keen et al. 2008).1 Horizontal equity is promoted, but a movement away from a 
progressive system will imply large revenue losses and an increase in the tax burden 
of low-income and middle-income taxpayers (to maintain revenue neutrality), 
jeopardising vertical equity (see Keen et al. 2008: 736–737). The third option for 
personal income tax reform is a presumptive tax approach (see Taube & Tadesse 
1996; Balestrino & Galmarini 2005; Bird & Zolt 2005). It is an effective way of raising 
revenue and broadening the tax base whenever the government lacks the capability 
of properly administering an income tax, and horizontal and vertical equity may be 
enhanced (by taxing the informal sector and the self-employed). At most, however, 
it serves a complementary role to the CPIT system in taxing the hard-to-tax and 
drawing this group of informal income earners into the tax net.
The dual income tax (DIT) approach is the “more promising alternative” 
suggested for reforming personal income tax in developing countries (see Bird & 
Zolt 2005: 940; Bird & Zolt 2010; Boadway 2005).2 The dual income tax system taxes 
personal capital income (for example, interest, capital gains, profits from personal 
businesses) separately from labour income. A single proportional rate for capital 
income is set equal to the lowest income tax rate (the first income tax bracket) on 
personal (wage) income. Labour income (for example, wages, salaries) is subject to 
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a progressive rate structure, which provides for tax deductions and exemptions to 
achieve equity objectives. Overall, the taxation of labour income is therefore higher 
than on capital income. A lower flat tax rate on capital income and a progressive tax 
on labour income is a pragmatic way to deal with problems of capital flight and tax 
arbitrage activities, and reduces the distortions implicit to the differential treatment of 
different sources of capital income. By lowering the tax rate on capital, the capital tax 
base can be expanded by eliminating tax incentives. The tax system is simplified, and 
compliance may improve with concomitant revenue effects. Horizontal inequities are 
avoided, and discrimination against savings (using the life-time income approach) is 
reduced. Because the tax base is broadened (in that there are no tax preferences and 
exclusions), the DIT system is administratively simplified.
Income-splitting mechanisms with all kinds of special tax rules are, however, 
required for self-employed and other small entrepreneurs, which makes the DIT 
imperfect. This administrative challenge is the Achilles heel of the system (Sørensen 
2007: 566; Sørensen 2005: 780–781). It is a matter of concern that adopting different 
tax rates for labour and capital income will have revenue implications. If lower rates 
are levied on capital income, tax rates on labour income will have to be increased to 
maintain or increase income tax revenue. This will have equity consequences. From 
a vertical equity perspective, lower tax rates on capital may be viewed as unfair, since 
capital income is earned mainly by the rich. Introducing a dual income tax system 
in developing countries will not be problem free. A number of design issues emerge 
(see Bird & Zolt 2010: 197–206; Barreix & Roca 2007). Policy-makers have to consider 
the relative tax rates for labour (i.e. the top marginal PIT rate) and capital income 
(for example, equal to or higher than the lowest PIT rate), the zero bracket amount 
for labour and capital, the definition of capital income (active and passive capital 
income), setting the company tax rate (for example, equal to or higher than the rate 
for unincorporated business profits) and taxing normal returns on capital (or only 
excess returns). 
The DIT provides the flexibility that developing countries need both to meet 
the international competition for capital and to maintain or even increase the 
progressiveness generated by the personal income tax system. A progressive dual 
income tax (and CPIT) satisfies the vertical equity tax principle ‘more accurately’ 
than a flat tax rate system, and once the life-time income approach is used as the basis 
of comparison, the DIT is also horizontally fair (OECD 2006: 131). The Uruguayan 
version of a dual income tax shows a more than 2 percentage point improvement in the 
after-tax Gini coefficient (Barreix & Roca 2007: 133). This exceeds the disappointing 
results obtained using the comprehensive income tax system. The dual income tax 
system appears to sacrifice neutrality; income from capital is taxed differently to 
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income from labour. Furthermore, vertical equity is sacrificed for horizontal equity. 
The real advantage of the DIT is that efficiency gains can be achieved by taxing all 
capital at the same low rate.
Conclusions
1Since 1994, the personal income tax system in South Africa has been reviewed and 
reformed in many respects. All these reforms were aligned with government’s tax 
policy, which aimed to improve collection efficiency, reduce the economic distortions 
associated with the tax structure and lower the costs of investment and job creation, 
and release household spending power. The approach taken by National Treasury 
was in line with the ‘holy trinity’ of tax reform suggested by tax experts (including 
the Katz Commission), and required improving tax administration, broadening the 
tax base and lowering tax rates.
From the preceding sections, it is evident that before 1994, the share of personal 
income tax in total tax revenue relative to other tax sources was at a very high level. 
Since 1994, the relative contribution decreased somewhat but remains high. When 
the incidence of VAT, the fuel levy and user charges are added and the limited size 
of the tax base is considered, it is doubtful whether there is room to increase the 
burden. The total tax burden on individuals has remained more or less constant 
since 1994 and is high in comparison with other developing countries. Moreover, the 
South African PIT base is already taxed very intensively compared with developing 
countries. The personal income tax structure is progressive. Between 1997 and 2000, 
personal income taxes first became less progressive and then increased marginally 
in progressivity between 2000 and 2009. Unfortunately personal income tax reforms 
over the last two decades have not really resulted in an improvement of the income 
distribution. Furthermore, there is some consensus that personal income taxation is 
not a very suitable instrument for redistribution purposes in developing countries. 
South Africa, however, still faces the twin challenges of improving the income 
distribution and increasing tax revenue to meet ever-increasing demands for public 
services. Conventional wisdom, or good tax policy, dictates a reduction in PIT rates, 
but as part of the fall-out of the global financial crisis (and for equity reasons), further 
reductions will be resisted. Instead, globally there is populist sentiment in favour of 
raising top marginal PIT rates. The PIT rate in South Africa is at the same level as 
the average OECD rates. The scope for higher personal income tax rates seems to be 
constrained by already-high marginal tax rates, a small tax base and a CIT rate that 
is lower than the top marginal PIT rate.
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Consideration was given to the possibility that the revenue and distributional 
challenges are due to the failure of the semi-comprehensive income tax system to 
which South Africa adheres. An in-depth analysis of this possibility is simply beyond 
the scope of this study, but current international thinking on tax reform by eminent 
policy researchers and recent tax reform studies by the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(IFS) and the OECD provided a foundation for a brief discussion of alternative PIT 
design options. The tax reform option that holds promise for South Africa (and 
developing countries) is the dual income tax system. The DIT provides the flexibility 
that developing countries need both to meet the international competition for capital 
and to maintain or even increase the progressiveness generated by the personal 
income tax system. In designing tax systems, it is almost inevitable that governments 
will be faced with policy conflicts and goal choices. Tax fairness, efficiency, neutrality 
and administrative simplicity cannot always be achieved simultaneously and must 
sometimes be traded off. The dual income tax system appears to sacrifice neutrality, 
since income from capital is taxed differently to income from labour. It does have the 
advantage of improving horizontal equity.
The forces that impact on tax reform are clearly diverse, but Norregaard and 
Kahn (2007: 3–7) suggest that a common set of factors steers countries to adopt the 
same approach to tax reform. These include globalisation (and the increased mobility 
of factors of production), employment creation and the need to remove labour tax 
impediments, a ‘subtle’ change of views in favour of tax efficiency in the efficiency–
equity trade-off and ‘herd behaviour’, involving the adoption of fashionable tax 
policies (for example, flat taxes). The dual income tax may well become a popular 
alternative to the present comprehensive income tax system in developing countries. 
A much more comprehensive analysis is required, however, to determine whether 
South Africa should run with the herd.
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Endnotes
1  The sections on the flat rate income tax and DIT draw to some extent from my contri-
bution to income tax reform in Black, Calitz & Steenekamp (2011: 234–239). 
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2 For a comprehensive analysis of the dual income tax system in developed countries, see 
Sørensen (2005: 777–801), Sørensen (2007: 557–602) and Sørensen and Johnson (2010: 
179–235). The potential for introducing the dual income tax in developing countries is 
discussed in great detail in Bird & Zolt (2010) and Boadway (2005: 910–927).
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